Derridian undecidability and leadership

According to Laclau (in Deconstruction, Pragmatism, Hegemony, 1996) one concept that is central to contemporary political theory is that of representation. “The condition of a good representation is, apparently, [emphasis in original] that there is perfect or transparent transmission, by the representative, of the will of those whom he represents” says Laclau. And yet the tasks of popluar leaders consists, often, of providing followers with a language by which they are able to formulate their political identity and will. When the represented need representation (which is the inherent utility of representation) it is usually because their identities, or voices, need supplementing, in this case via the agency of a representative. This act of supplementarity means that the role of the representative cannot be neutral, not when they are lending, in proxy, their own voice to the absent represented. There cannot be perfect transmission when representatives play an active role in the formation of the collective wills of those whom they represent.

From a political standpoint, is it not agreed that the more democratic a process, the more transparent is the transmission of the will of those represented by their representatives? Does this not also stand for the process of leadership? That the better leadership is demonstrated by the greater transparency of the transmission between leader and follower? That the successful leader embodies, enacts and gives voice to, without manipulation, distortion or corruption, the will of their followers to whom they entrust their intentions? But this seems not the case: there appear to be flaws in the notion of representation: there is (a Derridian) structural undecidability in the notion of representation, an infinite deferral, an impossibility